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ABSTRACT: In searching for the origin of Europe and the cultural region/continent that we call 
“Europe”, at first  glance we have to consider at least a double view: on the one hand the 
geographical understanding which indicates a region or a continent; on the other  a certain form 
of identity and culture described and defined as European. Rodolphe Gasché taking hint from 
Husserl’s passage ‘Europe is not to be construed simply as a geographical and political entity’ 
states that a rigorous engagement with what we understand by “Europe” requires that we 
acknowledge it as involving ‘something else as well’.  
With regard to the many bequests of Europe, founded in ancient Greece, in this essay I will 
attempt to elucidate some essential features of its cultural identity such as science and philosophy, 
and reflect upon several specific aspects: on the origin of Europe, on its roots and heritage, on 
the concept of culture, and especially on the foundation of sciences (Geometry), which contains 
a large part of European spirit and civilization. In particular I will address some European 
historical moments referring to Husserl, Heidegger, the concept of Thaumazein… In the second 
part of the essay, I shift to Ancient Greece to access the value of the Esprit de géométrie as defined 
in Proclus on the Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s. 
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* 
In his book Europe, or the infinite task-A Study of  a Philosophical Concept, Gasché begins 
with a close reading of Edmund Husserl's célèbre Crisis of  European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). It is well known that in the opening of his 
Vienna lecture, Husserl claims that Europe stands for the project of reshaping 
humankind in the light of a ‘genuine’ humanity- a humanity that is much more 
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than membership in a particular ethnicity. Husserl’s project aims to recreate the 
same “breakthrough that takes place in early Greece by the irruption into 
consciousness of the very concept of humanity as a concept transcending all 
particular humanities”.1 According to Husserl this irruption gave rise to science 
and stimulated a kind of susceptibility to live in a world insofar as it seemed new. 
For Husserl, the European project is founded completely upon the idea of 
thinking and acting in view of what is universal.  
This idea of philosophy “is not merely one of tasks (Aufgaben, literally, 
assignments) depending on a programmatic and normative knowledge that 
merely needs to be applied but of infinite tasks -a concept that Husserl probably 
borrowed from the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, who has systematically 
highlighted the importance of the concept of “task” in Kant-and concerns tasks 
that devolve from ideas, that because infinite, constitute universal tasks”.2 Indeed, 
Husserl’s reference to the stand point from which the idea of philosophy makes 
itself known implies that philosophy does not impose itself as a self-evident, 
culturally specific product. Rather, from the outset it justifies itself in term that 
call on everyone, regardless of usual, customary way of thinking. What makes 
this idea so odd is that it answers itself and does so with a view toward principles 
and rules that can be followed and reconstructed by everyone as long as on 
condition that particular modes of thinking are bracketed. The self presentation 
from the standpoint of universal humankind shows this idea to be one of 
humankind itself. Indeed, the breakthrough that takes place in early Greece is 
the irruption into consciousness of the very concept of humanity itself as a 
concept transcending all particular humanities”. 3   
 Further along in his reading, Gasché remembers that according to Husserl, 
although the European spirit is born in ancient Greece, it manifested itself again 
in the Renaissance as something “which is at once a reestablishment (Nachstiftung) 
and a modification of the Greek primal establishment”(C71).4 For Husserl, this 
re-establishment was not just an irruption but a rebirth, and involved a critical 
examination of tradition. Galileo, the Renaissance scientist par excellence, 
transmitted ancient Greek heritage in such a way that he “did not feel the need 
to go into the manner in which the accomplishment of idealization originally 
arose (i.e., how it grew on the underlying basis of the pre-geometrical, sensitive 
world and its practical arts) or to occupy himself with questions about the origins 
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of apodictic, mathematical self-evidence”.5 Moreover, Ancient mathematics and 
Euclidian geometry, he observes, knew only finite tasks: ‘pure mathematics and 
geometry had their origin in this method for securing intersubjective truth, and 
it is this origin that provided them which their true meaning. “This is the premise 
on the basis of which Husserl argues that by taking the achievements of these 
disciplines for granted, Galileo had become oblivious to geometry’s and 
mathematics’ origin in the life-world that alone makes them meaningful for 
humankind”.6 
** 
To summarize, “the new sciences come into being by modeling themselves 
after ancient geometry are disconnected from the pre-scientific life in the given 
world.” Gasché continues his comment on Husserl this way: ”Even though as a 
thinking being, ‘the man of everyday life… has the katalon (i. e.,) the notion of the 
general, or universal, in everyday life’, he achieves only relative truths”.7  And he 
suggests that ‘’the idea of a universal science that erupts for the first time in 
Greece, and that constitutes the idea of Europe”. 8  
  Years ago, reflecting on the same narrative, Klaus Held in a dense essay 
wrote:”The consideration of the European origin of science and democracy 
among the Greeks will additionally have recourse above all to the thought of 
Heraclitus. For, so far as may be determined from the fragmentary character of 
what has been handed down to us from that period, Heraclitus was the first 
thinker who reflected upon the earliest scientific activity and, at the same time, 
who first contemplated communal life in the Greek polis, where democracy was 
developing in his day”.8 Of these features of European civilization spoke also M. 
Heidegger in the Conference Was ist das- Die Philosophie? "If they (science and 
democracy) are able to leave a mark of the civilization of the entire world it is 
because they issue from the core of the European historical process, which is to 
say, the philosophic process".9 The civilization of the whole planet, the sciences 
of the whole planet have this mark. Again, recalling Heidegger’s planetary 
thinking: "If they are able to give their own imprint today, if that specifies the 
history of the European man on the whole planet, this happens because they 
draw origin from the most internal process European history, that is to say, from 
the philosophic one"10 
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 The word ϕιλοσοϕια, philosophy, in such a way comes to coincide with the 
birth of our history, and that of the present epoch. ‘The Greek adjective 
ϕιλοσοϕοζ, philosopher, attached to man, very probably coined by Heraclitus, 
means him who loves sophon, him who can speak as the logos speaks. The relation 
between philein and logos is αρµονια; but harmony is not something of static and 
fixed; it is not a synthesis; it is tension toward the logos, tension for knowledge, 
establishing a new relation with “the world”.11 As Klaus Held observes: “Using  
the concept of “world” in this contest, we make, usually without remarking upon 
it, a simple assumption. We understand by this the totality of that to which human 
comportment can be related and we assume that this “totality” can be viewed as 
a whole.12 
 Here it is useful, anyway, to make a well-timed distinction between harmony 
and what in English we call attunement (German Stimmung). The first is the 
experience of moods, which stir or shake us deeply and has a lasting effect on our 
whole lives, the second is the superficial attunement, the rapidly fluctuating good 
and bad mood of everyday life. The first experience arises from out of the 
fundament or ground (Grund) of human existence and constitutes simultaneously 
the ground or reason (Grund) for the discovery, by individuals or communities, of 
the possibilities from which human existence receives its measure. In this case the 
right and critical meaning of logos is not “gathering,” as Heidegger suggests, it can 
be better signified by the expression “laying-open of a relation”.  
  At the beginning of the Greek tradition of philosophical and scientific 
thinking, Plato and Aristotle observed that thinking has arisen from thaumazein 
(wonder); they explained that thaumazein is something such as pathos, “suffering”. 
The happy occurrence of wonder is concurrent with the darkness of nothing and 
presents itself as a shadowy abyss. Thaumazein initially makes one speechless; yet, 
it doesn’t wish to abide in speechlessness, but demands that things, showed in the 
newly appearing world, are brought forth in language and knowledge. Klaus 
Held concludes his previous reflection: “Through the Greek philosophy and science the 
pathos of  thaumazein became, for the first and only time in the history of  humankind, first and 
foremost the cultural founding force for the European culture and civilization” 13 . 
Aristotle was the first to introduce the term theôria, “theory,” for this kind of 
knowing. The “theoretical” man, in that original Greek sense, is always striving 
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for knowledge; he does not only investigate that which may be useful for him 
within the limited field of vision of a particular life-world. He is interested simply 
in beings insofar as they are. The theoretical man considers, as Aristotle says, the 
being as being, not simply as it belongs to one of the many life-world horizons. 
The human bios-theoreticos has touched the limit of the ontology of subjectivity, 
this is because philosophy has been led to this limit’ to extend beyond the limit 
every non discursive experience of thaumazein, to transform what can be only a 
fleeting moment.  Aristotle remarks, on the way, that the Ionians had scholê, that 
is “leisure”; they had time free from life’s necessities, and began to philosophize. 
Only with the leisure, made possible by economic prosperity, the inhabitants of 
Ionia could open up the world in a manner so new and radical. These living 
conditions and such prosperity have occurred here and there, but in other 
countries and cultures without giving rise to philosophy or science.  
 The wonder, with the awe that distinguishes it, motivated science and 
stimulated a kind of susceptibility to the light of the world insofar as it seemed 
new. The sensation of birth, of coming-to-be of the human being equally applied 
to all citizens, made clear that the only life-world on this earth may be lived in 
common with all human beings. In this lies always a hope for path breaking new 
beginnings, within which the first birth, as it were, repeats itself. If one could clear the way 
for something new, this was possible only because one saw the world “in a new 
light”. The hierarchic life-system of the old Greek polis, its pyramidal structure 
was modified.  
 In a very lucid passage of Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Etudes de psychologie 
historìque J. P. Vernant writes: “All “common things” must be object for free 
debate, for public discussion in the plain light of agora, directed by different 
subjects, among those who take part of political collectivity”.14 Vernant would tell 
us that the Greek polis begot a turning shift from the mythical vision of the world 
and society to the scientific one. At dawn of culture and civilization a new 
conception of the world flourished, defined by science and by the image that the 
polis gave of itself by means of its political dictionary (See the Cleisthenes’ polis 
modeled by the geometric rationality; see also the influence of geometry in 
Platonic Republic. 
In reference to ‘irruption’ and ‘natality’, in the last  century Hannah Arendt 
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eloquently wrote that the possibility for humans to live together democratically 
now depends upon the fact that the spirit of birth or re-birth, the spirit of ‘natality’, 
or another beginning remain alive. This concept of modest awe led Greeks to 
found the essence of democracy expressly on human rights. 
 THE ESPRIT ‘DE GÉOMÉTRIE’ 
Let us consider, in a short historical survey, the Greek legacy of science and 
mathematics. 
 At the distance of more than two millennia we still accept the existence of 
science as nearly self-evident, so that in order to better understand it, we still need 
to return to origin and try to discover why, in a particular moment of history, the 
Greeks felt themselves to be in harmony with the cosmos at the centre of the 
universe.  
According to many scholars the Greek miracle of mathematics and the birth 
of philosophy occurred simultaneously. The epistemologist M. Serres writes: 
“Now, to reply to the problem of the Greek beginning of geometry compels one, 
exactly, to ask how it is passed from one language to another, from one language 
considered natural and from its alphabetical connotation to the natural rigorous 
language and from its alphabetical connotation to the rigorous and systematic 
language for numbers, measures, axioms and rigorous reasoning, written and 
annotated in equations and figures”. 15 The language of the esprit of geometry was 
born by means of pure figures and demonstrations. But, who was the first geometer? 
Surely a philosopher able to transfer his thinking from the practical, the finite, the 
particular, and the surrounding world to a special  vision and theoretic knowledge 
of the known and unknown, of spaces and times inside the horizon of one open 
infinite. On the historical revolutions, continuity and discontinuity, pre-historical 
path and progressive expansion of mathematics I  refer again to M. Serres who  
compellingly defines “the quantitative purification of its concepts, the always 
strengthened power of its methods, the movement in ahead towards a 
mathematical conceived as horizon allows to think a shape evolutionary 
connected, but articulated from stages, stages or crisis, total reorganizations of a 
knowledge transmitted without losses, therefore incessantly accumulated”.16 This 
idea recalls the archaic geometry of the ancient Greeks, the concrete empirical 
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science that began in Miletus with a kind of investigation called historiê. The 
Milesians were, indeed, the first philosophers and geometers to use the 
demonstration as proof in order to promote greater rigor in sciences.   
During the Hellenistic age, science and philosophy separated: Athens 
remained the centre of philosophical research, and Alexandria became the centre 
of scientific studies and discoveries, but the speculative spirit of the first Greeks 
continued and the sciences improved substantially. It is in this epoch that Euclid 
came to the fore, having received his mathematical training in Athens, and he 
may himself have been a Platonist. Proclus says that Euclid was of the school of 
Plato and in close touch with that philosophy. One thing is certain; Euclid taught 
and founded a school at Alexandria.  
Euclid’s principal work, as known, is the mathematical and geometric treatise 
Elements composed originally in thirteen books, written in Egypt near 300 BC. 
Euclidean geometry, as well as the ancient Greek version of number theory, the 
oldest extant axiomatic deductive treatment of geometry, and proven 
instrumental in the development of logic and modern science. On this basis, a 
large number of propositions are proved with a high degree of deductive rigour 
including a collection of definitions, postulates (axioms), propositions (theorems), and 
proofs. The Elements were one of the very first books to go to press, second only to 
the Bible in number of published editions. Although many of the results in 
Elements originated with earlier mathematicians, one of Euclid's accomplishments 
was to present them in a single, logically coherent framework. For centuries, 
when the medieval quadrivium was included in the curriculum of all university 
students, the knowledge of at least part of Euclid's Elements was required all 
students.  
*** 
During the 17th century- in my view a very fundamental century in European 
history for the  development of the sciences, I wonder what were mathematicians’ 
attitude towards the Elements especially given the recovery and the publication of 
the Greek texts in the editio princeps on September 1533 at Basel. Firstly, there was 
an increasingly detached interest in the Greek text, both in its philological and 
epistemological merits, which was followed by an interest in creating the Latin 
versions. A generation later, in 1572 F. Commandino writes the first Latin edition 
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in Pisa, and translates it into Italian in Urbino 1575; earlier by P. C. Clavius prints 
Books I-XV in Rome; many others are printed in other European languages.                     
   European mathematicians of this period were engaged in revisiting and 
restating the work of Euclide in canonical forms, but they also tried publishing it 
at a popular level. A pressing academic requirement in 17th century was to restore 
the Elements, as witnessed by the publication of Euclides restitutus 1658 by G. Borrelli 
in Latin, the V Book of  the Elements by Galileo, published in 1674 by V. Viviani in 
Italiano, the Euclide restituto 1680 and 1686 by V. Giordano in Italiano, the Nouveaux 
elements de geometries 1667 by F. Arnauld in France, Euclidis elementorum books XV 
breviter demonstrati the 1655 by I. Barrow and Geometric Euclidis elementa novo order ac 
methodo to fere demonstrata 1678 by N. Mercator in Latin, just to mention a few. 
There were no scarsity of adaptations such as reduced editions for the 
requirements of the general readers. Currently the most printed and remarkable 
were the first four books, those of plane geometry.  
By means an aside, I wish to stress here the historic and fundamental 
influence of Proclus. According to many scholars the Prologue of the Commentary 
on the First Book of  Euclid’s Elements by17 Proclus is a treatise of philosophy of 
mathematic, a theoretical and methodological guide of the geometer. It tells us 
what geometry is. The Commentary has two parts: a)Prologue that has much to say 
about Platonic, Peripatetic, and allegedly Pythagorean philosophy, and gives a 
general history of Greek mathematicians. b)The rest of the Commentary is an 
item by item the discussion of Book I of the Elements.  It is almost certainly a 
written version of lectures which he presented to students and associates in Athens 
in the mid-fifth century. In this present essay, I offer only a few selections from 
Proclus’work. 
  With his experience of diadochos, since the beginning in the Prologue (Part 
One) Proclus writes: ‘Mathematical being necessary belongs neither among the 
first nor among the last simple of the kinds of being, but occupies the middle 
ground between the partless realities-simple, incomposite, and indivisible-and 
divisible things characterized by every variety of composition and differentiation. 
The unchangeable, stable, and incontrovertible character of the propositions 
about it shows that it is superior to the kinds of things that move about in matter. 
But the discursiveness of mathematical procedure, its dealing with its subjects as 
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extended, and its setting up of different prior principles for different objects-these 
give to mathematical being a rank below that indivisible nature that is completely 
grounded in itself ’. 18 
Further along in the text, Proclus states that Plato assigned different types of 
knowing to the highest, the intermediated, and the lowest grades of reality. ‘To 
indivisible realities he assigned intellect, which discerns what is intelligible   with 
simplicity and immediacy and by its freedom from matter, its purety, and its 
uniform mode of coming in contact with being is superior to all other forms of 
knowledge. To divisible things in the lowest level of nature, that is, to all objects 
of sense-perception, he assigned opinion, which lays hold of truth obscurity, 
whereas to intermediates, such as the forms studied by mathematics, which fall 
short of indivisible but are superior to divisible nature, he assigned understanding. 
Though second in rank to intellect and the highest knowledge, understanding is 
more perfect, more exact, and purer than opinion’. 19 
And in chapter II, we read:  
As the forms of knowing differ from one another, so also are their objects different 
in nature…. Mathematical objects, and in general all the objects of the 
understanding, have an intermediated position. They go beyond the objects of 
intellect in being divisible, but they surpass sensible thing in being devoid of 
matter…To find the principles of mathematical being as a whole, we must ascend 
to those all-pervading principles that generate everything from themselves: namely, 
the Limit and the Unlimited. Consequently more ahead ‘Mathematicals are the 
offspring of the Limit and the Unlimited, but not the primary principles alone, nor 
of the hidden intelligible causes, but also of secondary principles that proceed from 
them and, in cooperation with one another, suffice to generate the intermediate 
orders of things and the variety that they display.20 
Following his earlier discourse, in chapter VII Proclus suggests: ‘But from the 
being of mathematical concepts let us go back to that unitary science which we 
showed to be prior to the several mathematical sciences. Let us consider its 
function, its poker, and the scope of its activities. 
We must lay it down that the function of general mathematics is, as we said 
earlier, dianoetic thinking. It is not the kind of thought that characterizes intellect, 
steadfastly based on itself, perfect and self sufficient, ever converging upon itself. 
Nor it is such as goes with opinion and perception, for these forms of knowing fix 
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their attention on external things and with concern themselves with objects 
whose causes they do not possesses. By contrast mathematics, though beginning 
with reminders from the outside world, ends with the ideas that it has within; it 
is awakened to activity by lower realities, but its destination is the higher being of 
forms. Its activity is not motionless, like that of the intellect, but because its motion 
is not change of place or quality, as is that of the senses, but a life-giving activity, 
it unfolds and traverses the immaterial cosmos of ideas, now moving from first 
principles to conclusion, now proceeding in the opposite direction, now 
advancing from what it already knows to what it seeks to know, and again 
referring its results back to the principles that are prior in knowledge. Moreover, 
it is not, like Nous above inquiry because filled from itself, nor it is satisfied, like 
perception, with matters other than itself; rather it advances through inquiry to 
discovery and moves from imperfection to perfection”. 21 
Returning to my initial reference to what I term the ‘Greek miracle of 
geometry’ I cannot help  remembering Kant’s famous words written in  18th 
century in his Preface to Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787 2nd). In the following passage, 
Kant seems to believe in a sort of discovery (irruption?) of the kind that gave rise 
to science:  “A new light broke upon the first person who demonstrated the 
isosceles triangle (whether he was called “Thales” or had some other name). For 
he found that what he had to do was not to trace what he saw in this figure, or 
even trace its mere concept, and read off, as it were, from the properties of the 
figure; but rather that he had to produce the latter from what he himself thought 
into the object and presented (through construction) according to apriori concepts 
and that in order to know something securely a priori he had to ascribe to the 
thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had put into 
it in accordance with its concept”.22  
Jumping ahead to the twentieth century, following the First World War, 
among philosophers and literati who took part in a wide-ranging forum on the 
identity of Europe were included figures such as M. Heidegger, E. Husserl, 
Ortega y Gasset, Nikolaj Berdjaev-, and P. Valery. In particular, Valery treated 
the ‘European cultural identity’ as a serious subject, and in his role as poet and 
writer, presents an imaginary European Hamlet who leans from a terrace that 
overlooks the whole of Europe and its million of ghosts: "But he is an intellectual 
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Hamlet who reflects on the life and on the death of the truth. His ghosts are the 
objects of our controversies; his regrets are the titles of our glory. He is oppressed 
by the weight of his discoveries, of his knowledge, and is incapable of any action. 
He reflects on the boredom of a past that needs to be re-discovered, at the folly 
of continual innovation. He is thorn between two crevasses, since two are the 
dangers confronting the world: order and disorder".23  After descending from the 
terrace, the European Hamlet picks up a skull and recognizes it on account of  
trace of the development of European history: here is the skull of Leonardo da 
Vinci, and then that of Leibniz, who, between the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
century, sought a universal European peace; and that of Kant who was also 
looking for “perpetual peace” apparently at the antipodes of Heraclitus, the 
founder of European philosophy. From Kant’s skull issues those of Hegel, of Marx 
"Kant qui genuit Hegel, qui genuit Marx, qui genuit… " And so on. And if the 
European intellectual were to abandon all the skulls of the past and throw them 
in a ditch, would he still be himself? What would the European intellectual 
become? It is time to say goodbye to ghosts since there is no longer any need for 
them? Surely Valery would have added the names of Pythagoras, Euclid and 
Archimedes, Galileo, Descartes and Leibniz, as mathematician, Newton etc... to 
the list, given that within the same essay he doesn’t forget geometry.  
Valery closes with a statement that is not scientific, but which defines  the 
‘European man’ as one with three essential characteristic: “As far as I am 
concerned any people who have been influenced throughout history by Greece, 
Rome and Christianity are Europeans”. Further along in the text he ebulliently 
praises mathematics and geometry, stating: Greek geometry has been that 
incorruptible model, and not only model, proposed for every type of knowledge 
that aims at the state of perfection: an incomparable model of the more typical 
qualities of the European reasoning. I never think of classic art without 
necessarily taking as an example that monument to reason that is Greek 
geometry. The construction of such a monument has demanded rare and more 
naturally incomparable gifts. The men who have constructed it were solid and 
sagacious workers, deep thinkers, but also talented artists with the fineness and 
the exquisite sense of the perfection...24 
In his synthesis of the philosophical and scientific value of mathematics, we 
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can agree with Serres that: “Mathematics is therefore:  so objective that it is the 
only one that is truly collective; so collective that it is the only one that is truly 
objective; so useless that it is the only one that is truly useful; so outer that it is the 
only one that is truly inner; so inner that it is the only one that is truly outer; so 
in the being that is outstanding at the knowledge; so in being that it excels in 
knowledge; so abstract that it is the only one that is truly concrete, so concrete 
that it has been believed, sometimes, that its space was the shape of the external 
sense”.25 
Today, among the contemporary philosophers, Alain Badiou claims that 
‘Mathematics has been ever since Greek origins, a condition for philosophy ... 
Mathematics is recognized as having a certain capacity for thinking ‘first 
principle’, or for the knowledge of being and of truth,26 and nevertheless entirely 
separate from the questions, or questioning, proper to philosophy. In the Divided 
line of Plato, in the Republic, the fact that mathematics in the educational 
programme for the guardians corresponds to dianoia shows that mathematics 
plays a preliminary role. But, again, according to Badiou, there is something 
fundamental pinpointed in Glaucon’s speech (Rep.VI) when he observes that 
mathematics is metaxu, i. e. an in between, midway between doxa and epiststeme, 
opinion and intellect. In the same passage of the Republic the mathema is situated 
at the side of dianoia.  
“Plato constructs his Parable of the Line to identify this total area as the noetos topos- 
the area of the intelligible, or as the noeton genos, the genus of the intelligible. . . He 
dramatizes this antithesis as one between the visible and intelligible worlds . . . The 
mind must be taught to enter a new syntactical condition, that of the mathematical 
equation, in preference to the syntax of the story”.27 
The mathematicians (the geometers) proceed according to the intelligible, 
and the body of the symbols they use, the written language they use, are the more 
perspicuous vehicle for logical relations.  So states Badiou: ‘Up to and including 
Kant, mathematics and philosophy were so entwined that Kant (following 
Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and many others) still saw in the mythical names of 
Thales a congenial origin of mathematics and of knowing in general. 28  
It seems impossible to deny that from a new spirit of world-openness, the spirit 
of re-birth, which appeared on the stage of human history with the Greek 
“discovery of the world”, European culture and sciences achieved its peculiar 
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form of “identity” through the epochal stages of its history. I would like, in closing, 
to assume that genuine historical return is the decisive beginning for an authentic 
futurity, to deepen the issue of the origin of Europe, its mythologized and plural 
roots and heritage, the myriad of frameworks for ‘culture’ and the foundations of 
sciences, especially Geometry, which portray a large part of European spirit and 
civilization.  
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